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Psychoanalysis and Identity in Architecture 
 
John Hendrix 
 
 
 
Architecture at its best is an expression and reflection of the human psyche, 
in which cultural identity plays an important role. In order to understand bet-
ter the role that architecture plays in changing concepts of cultural identity, it 
is helpful to understand better the role that cultural identity plays in the hu-
man psyche. Cultural identity is given by language, and an important part of 
the psyche is composed of the laws, relations and customs of a cultural iden-
tity as given by language, what Jacques Lacan called the Symbolic Ego, as 
given by the Other, the linguistic matrix, which is what forms the uncon-
scious. The Imaginary Ego, the independent bodily and sense experience of 
the individual, is absorbed into the Symbolic Ego, as a result of the Mirror 
Stage, though not without internal conflict. In architecture, how can the 
physical, sensual experience of the architecture be absorbed into the symbol-
ic, linguistic experience of the architecture in such a way that the architecture 
reflects the role of cultural identity in the human psyche in a way that is res-
onant to everyone in a culturally pluralistic world? What is the relationship 
between architecture and individual and collective ego formation? In archi-
tecture, as in any language, particular vocabulary elements have particular 
cultural associations. This makes the architecture, in one way, metaphysical: 
the vocabulary elements function as signifiers, and communicate an idea 
which is independent of its material presence. How are culturally specific 
ideas represented by the signifiers in the material presence of architecture in 
a way that has resonance for everyone? What are the elements of identity 
formation, as communicated in architecture, that all human beings share?  
      According to Lacan, the irrationality of the rational sequence of meto-
nyms, the presence of absence within signification, or within meaning, is 
made present at the point the metonymic chain in language produces signifi-
cation, which is the “anchoring point,” the point de capiton, which occurs 
retroactively, after a phrase is completed, and is the point at which the net-
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work of signifiers in the metonymic chain corresponds to a network of signi-
fiers in the concept, and thus accomplishes signification. The metonymic 
chain accomplishes this without “crossing the bar” into meaning, or the sig-
nified; the idea is not present in the metonym itself.   
      This type of production is labeled by Lacan “signifiance,” as opposed to 
significance or signifying, a type of production in language which does not 
cross the bar, the point of resistance, between the signifier and the signified 
in language, from the Saussurean model. Signifiance contains the presence of 
the irrational, as in architecture, and the absence of the signified, and thus the 
absence of the subject, and the absence of being, though it is predicated on 
the presence of that absence. As the concept of the metonym in language cor-
responds to the process of displacement or Verschiebung in Freudian dream 
work, in the relation between dream thoughts and dream images, the dialectic 
of the rational and irrational corresponds to the dialectic of conscious and 
unconscious thought. This correspondence leads to the formation of the La-
canian concept of the unconscious, that the unconscious is structured like a 
language, and it is through this concept that architecture and psychoanalysis, 
or the philosophy of the structure of the psyche, or the philosophy of the 
identity of the human subject, and in particular its identity in language, and 
the study of the mechanisms of conscious and unconscious thought, corre-
spond.       
      Unconscious thought is seen as a different form of thought than con-
scious thought, and exhibits aspects of the irrational in relation to the ration-
al. The linguistic structure of the dream image of Sigmund Freud is seen as 
diffuse, clumsy and awkward; it is missing the organization of conscious rea-
son, while its forms are mimetic of it. If the unconscious is the discourse of 
the Other, in Lacanian terms, if the unconscious is the network of language 
and rules into which the subject is inserted, it is only so in so far as it is a 
mimesis of the discourse of the Other. Dream images, the manifest content of 
the dream, are not capable of representing logical relations between the 
dream thoughts, the latent content of the dream, according to Freud in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, or of representing logical relations between con-
scious thoughts, the relations created by syntactical rules.  
      Dream images can be compared to architecture and the visual arts in their 
incapacity to incorporate to any significant degree the syntactical structures 
of language. The desire on the part of the visual arts, in particular architec-
ture, to engage as much as possible the syntactical structures of language, re-
flects the desire on the part of the arts to interweave the Imaginary and the 
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Symbolic, in Lacanian terms, in the complete constitution of the subject. The 
Imaginary corresponds to the perception of the image, and the mnemic or 
memory residue of the image which is incorporated in dreams, while the 
Symbolic corresponds to language, the signifying structure into which the 
perceiving subject is incorporated. In Freudian dream analysis, dreams re-
main a function of the Imaginary rather than the Symbolic, though the com-
position of the dream is determined by linguistic structures, which are the 
structure of the unconscious. 
      Linguistic structures which can be found in dream composition include 
metaphor and metonymy, which, as Lacan demonstrates, reveal the uncon-
scious in conscious discourse, as well as syntactical mechanisms such as el-
lipsis, pleonasm, hyperbaton, syllepsis, apposition, catachresis, and 
antonomasis, which are the mechanisms of condensation and displacement, 
regression and repetition, which contribute to the composition of dream im-
ages as elements of the unconscious registered in the subject by the Other of 
Lacan, the linguistic superstructure which determines the subject in ways that 
are not always conscious, and which do not always correspond to rational 
thought, but which can be revealed through dream work or composition in art 
and architecture. In that these are the mechanisms which allow the subject to 
moderate the dream discourse, they are not mechanisms of the dream itself, 
but rather the conscious reading of the dream; the unconscious can only be 
found in conscious thought, as an absence, and the irrational can only be 
found in rational thought, as that which is other to it within itself. 
      Among the syntactical mechanisms, ellipsis involves the omission of a 
word in a syntax without altering the signification, introducing a gap in the 
syntactical structure. A pleonasm is the use of more words than are necessary 
for the signification, so it is a repetition, and a condensation. A syllepsis is 
the use of a word in a syntax which agrees with one word in the syntax 
grammatically but not another, so it is a displacement, suggesting the irra-
tional within the rational. An apposition is the placing of a word in a sen-
tence to explain another word, as a repetition. A catachresis is the incorrect 
use of a word; an autonomasis is the use of a title instead of a name. These 
are the primary condensations and displacements, along with metaphor and 
metonymy, which are active in both language and dream construction. They 
can all be used as strategies in architectural composition.  
      Syllepsis can be found in the overlay or interweaving of geometrical 
forms, for example, where a form which is rotated or shifted might corre-
spond to one underlying form in a certain way but not to another. Such an 
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overlaying can result in the creation of a transformational relation, which 
signifies the relation between the form of the composition and the underlying 
conceptual structure of the composition, the signifier and that which is signi-
fied. As Vitruvius wrote, “Both in general and especially in architecture are 
these two things found: that which signifies and that which is signified.” The 
signifier of the architecture is the forms, geometrical solids and architectural 
vocabulary types, and their sensual appearance in space as perceived by the 
viewer, in the Imaginary of Lacan, while the signified is the conceptual rela-
tions between the forms as they are constructed in the mind of the viewer, in 
the Symbolic of Lacan. The signified in architecture involves frontality as 
opposed to spatial recession, solid as opposed to void, symmetry as opposed 
to asymmetry, axial as opposed to centrifugal, that is, the disposition of the 
forms as conceptualized in the composition, as the signified in language in-
volves the condensation and displacement of the syntactical mechanisms of 
dream work. In linguistics, the signifier of a language is the phonetic form or 
physical signal, while the signified is the corresponding mental analysis that 
arises in response to the physical signal of the phonetic form, as in architec-
ture. 
      The syllepsis can act as the point de capiton, the anchoring point of La-
can in the signifying chain, which is the point at which the overlay and in-
terweaving of the forms reveals an underlying conceptual structure, as the 
syntactical mechanisms do in language. The anchoring point of Lacan is the 
point at which, in the retroactive anticipation of meaning on the part of the 
subject in the course of the diachronic establishment of a syntactical struc-
ture, a sentence for example, the subject enters into the structure in the gap 
between signifiers, linguistic units, and is represented by one signifier to the 
next signifier, either diachronically or retroactively, and the subject becomes 
aware that there is a disjunction between the signifier in language and itself, 
a bar which cannot be crossed, because the structure of the signification, the 
discourse of the Other, is the unconscious, which is not accessible by con-
scious thought.  
      The anchoring point reveals the presence of the unconscious in conscious 
thought, and it reveals the presence of the irrational in rational discourse. The 
anchoring point can be analyzed in the syntactical mechanisms of dream 
work, or in architectural composition, for example the point at which a sys-
tem rotates or flips, forms are interwoven, or centripetal and centrifugal or-
ganizations overlap, revealing the signified of the composition in the 
signifier, or, as it might be seen, the unconscious in the conscious. 
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      An apposition would be one element of a geometrical form which is de-
signed to correspond to another geometrical form, as in a previous site condi-
tion; the apposition may be the doubling of an element, a self-repetition 
which reveals the repression of another element, as in metaphor. A catachre-
sis would be that element in a geometrical form which is purposefully out of 
place, as often happens in the dream; the catachresis reveals the self-
enclosure of the signifying system of the language, and the production of 
nonsense, as in metonymy. An autonomasis would be the substitution of a 
type-form for a form in the architectural composition, to stage the dialectic 
between the metaphysic of the architecture and the signifiance in which it is 
engaged, the signifying production, in the dialectic between the Symbolic 
and the Imaginary. 
      The coexistence of the mnemic image and the phonetic element in the 
writing of a dream is the coexistence of the Imaginary and Symbolic, and the 
coexistence of the mnemic residue of the visual perception and the mnemic 
residue of the auditory perception, the traces interwoven into the language of 
the unconscious. The visual residue is the “thing presentation” or Sachvor-
stellung, according to Freud, and the auditory residue is the “word presenta-
tion” or Wortvorstellung in the formation of the dream image, which is 
described by Freud as the transition from the latent content to the visual im-
age of the dream in a “concern for representability,” or Rücksicht auf Dar-
stellbarkeit. The coexistence of the thing and the word in the representation, 
in the writing of the dream, is a “double inscription” or Niederschrift which 
involves condensation and displacement, repression and repetition, and 
which corresponds to the coexistence of conscious and repressed or uncon-
scious images which may occur in the preconscious, in the memory of the 
dream, and which constitutes the structure of conscious language in the 
mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy in particular.  
      The Niederschrift contributes to the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz of the 
dream, which is the representation of a representation, according to Freud, 
but which, according to Lacan, is that which takes the place of the represen-
tation; the mnemic residue of an image in perception is transformed by syn-
tactical mechanisms in the unconscious as it is seen as the mnemic residue of 
the dream. The replacement of the representation poses a disjunction be-
tween what is seen by the subject and what is represented in the mind, be-
tween the signifier and the signified, as given by language, which structure 
perception itself. The disjunction between what is seen and what is repre-
sented to mind is the disjunction between sense-experience and reason in 
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metaphysics, between the real and the ideal, in the terms of Transcendental 
Idealism, or between the form and the idea in the terms of classical philoso-
phy. The disjunction of the metaphysic is displaced, in linguistics and psy-
choanalysis, from the structure of reason in consciousness to the structure of 
language and the unconscious, as seen in the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz. The 
disjunction between what is seen and what is represented reveals a divided 
subject, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, a subject which does not know itself, 
and a subject which is divided from its conscious reason, as reason becomes 
other to itself. The basis of Lacanian psychoanalysis is to be found in linguis-
tics, and in the study of perception, the nature of representation in vision. It is 
for that reason that psychoanalysis has such importance for art and architec-
ture. 
      As a result of the complex network of psychical relationships which pro-
duce the dream images, and the mechanisms of condensation and displace-
ment, dreams are composed of disconnected fragments of visual images, 
syntactical structure in language, and thoughts, the Sachvorstellung and the 
Wortvorstellung, which are seen in a variety of logical relations to each other 
in a palimpsest of traces which is difficult to unravel, and which can appear 
to be irrational. Architecture can appear as an irrational combination of a pal-
impsest of layers of rational relations between traces. The palimpsest of 
dream images is seen by Freud as the condensation and displacement of fig-
ures and spatial relationships, such as foreground and background, and the 
coincidence of opposites, as in the simultaneity of frontal and recessional or 
solid and void.  
      The network of logical relations which contribute to the composition of 
dream images is too complex to be unraveled in dream analysis. Displace-
ment, condensation, fragmentation, substitution and the coincidentia opposi-
torum, coincidence of opposites, are products of the complex network of 
logical relations, or the mnemic residues of such, in the Vorstellungs-
repräsentanz in dream thoughts, which is too complex to correspond to any 
logical structure. In the process of the dream formation, the logical links 
which hold the psychical material together are lost. It is the task of psychoa-
nalysis to restore the logical connections which the dream work has de-
stroyed, as dreams are seen as access to a knowledge of the unconscious 
activities of the mind, as Freud writes in The Interpretation of Dreams, an 
access to the psychical mechanisms which psychoanalysis seeks to under-
stand. Lacanian psychoanalysis furthers this quest in the analysis of the lin-
guistic mechanisms of which dreams are a product. 
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      The relation between the dream image and the dream thought, and the 
signifier and signified in any language, can be seen in the relation of the sub-
ject to language. The dream image responds to the dream thought, the latent 
content, in the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, as a form of psychical activity in 
response to perceptual activity. The content of the perception is anticipated 
and rearranged, as the subject is anticipated in language, retroactively; the 
word represents the image to another word as the signifier represents the sub-
ject to another signifier, and it is that series of relations which make both the 
dream and language intelligible. The representation of the image by the 
word, of the subject by the signifier, is a tool for intelligibility in architectur-
al composition. 
      Lacan compares the distortion or Enstellung described by Freud in the 
dream work to glissement in signification, the sliding of the signified under 
the signifier in the course of the signifying chain, as seen especially in meta-
phor, where one word takes the place of another, which bars the subject from 
signification, from the language which it produces in conscious thought. In 
the gap between what is perceived and what is represented in the dream as 
the mnemic residue of perception, a direct connection is lost in the process of 
distortion, as the connection is lost between the signifier and the signified in 
language. Freud’s dream condensation or Verdichtung is compared by Lacan 
to the combination of signifiers in metaphor. Displacement or Verschiebung 
is compared to the transfer of signification in metonymy, where the corre-
spondence between signifier and signified is maintained, but shifted, and 
rendered nonsensical. 
      The only difference between the mechanisms in language and the mech-
anisms in the dream work, according to Freud, is the difference between the 
intentions of communication in language and the consideration of represent-
ability in the dream, which is also a mechanism of a type of communication, 
which combines both Wortvorstellung and Sachvorstellung in conscious dis-
course, as can be seen in an architectural composition. The elision of the sub-
ject in language, in the dream and conscious discourse, creates an absence of 
the subject to itself in its reason. The anticipation of the subject in the signi-
fying chain caused by the absence of the subject, which occurs at the point de 
capiton, or the inaccessibility of the unconscious, is that which causes desire 
in the subject in signification, the impossible attempt to find fulfillment. The 
desire of the subject is the desire of the Other, for Lacan, the discourse of 
which the unconscious is composed. Desire is enacted by the objet a of La-
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can, that which is missing from the subject, and in perception the objet a is 
found in the Gaze, that which is missing from perception.  
      Architecture, in particular in compositional strategies and the interweav-
ing of geometries, enacts the objet a and the Gaze in describing the desire of 
the subject in the division of the subject in psychoanalysis, in the inaccessi-
bility of the subject to that which defines it, which is the unconscious. In this 
way, architecture can function as a diagrammatic model of human identity. 
Architecture represents the most complete expression of human identity pre-
cisely because it entails the impossibility of the reconciliation of the subjec-
tive and objective, of form and function, of conceptual and empirical reality. 
In that architecture must always be tied to functional requirements, it is art, 
that is, it express the human spirit, when its form contradicts itself, is other to 
itself, or when its form contradicts its function, enacting a transformational 
relation, and the disjunction between conscious and unconscious thought, be-
tween presence and absence in the human condition, is revealed. The uncon-
scious of the individual, and the collective unconscious of a culture, are 
known as an absence within a presence, and architecture functions to reveal 
that absence, to reveal the unconscious of a culture, the zeitgeist of a culture, 
and thus communicate a cultural identity. 
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